Report NEP-DES-2018-12-17
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018, "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2148, Dec.
- Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten, Onur, 2018, "Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2018:39, Dec, revised 31 Oct 2023.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Mikhail Freer, 2018, "Equilibrium Play in First Price Auctions: Revealed Preference Analysis," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2018-36, Dec.
- Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2018, "Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1812.02993, Dec.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2018, "Membership Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1804.
- Zhang, Shengxing, 2018, "Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 86800, Mar.
- Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018, "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 601, Nov.
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