Report NEP-DES-2018-12-17This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2148, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten , Onur, 2018. "Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools," Working Papers 2018:39, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Mikhail Freer, 2018. "Equilibrium Play in First Price Auctions: Revealed Preference Analysis," Working Papers ECARES 2018-36, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2018. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers," Papers 1812.02993, arXiv.org.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2018. "Membership Mechanism," Discussion Paper Series 1804, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Zhang, Shengxing, 2018. "Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86800, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018. "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Discussion Papers Series 601, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.