Report NEP-CDM-2006-04-08This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2006. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Discussion Papers 04-23r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Alexander F. Wagner & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Satisfaction with Democracy and the Environment in Western Europe â€“ a Panel Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 1660, CESifo Group Munich.
- Topi Miettinen & Panu Poutvaara, 2006. "Political Parties and Network Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1663, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Social Security and Retirement Decision: A Positive and Normative Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leigh, Andrew & Wolfers, Justin, 2006. "Competing Approaches to Forecasting Elections: Economic Models, Opinion Polling and Prediction Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 5555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Snowberg, Erik & Wolfers, Justin & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2006. "Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5591, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mazzuca, Sebastián L & Robinson, James A, 2006. "Political Conflict and Power-Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Staal, Klaas, 2006. "Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 104, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.