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Report NEP-CDM-2005-08-13
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Jean Hindriks & Benjamin Lockwood, 2005, "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 1509.
- Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2005, "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 5092, Jun.
- Lockwood, Ben & Hindricks, Jean, 2005, "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 5125, Jul.
- Rotemberg, Julio J., 2005, "Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 5146, Jul.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005, "Making Statements and Approval Voting," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1531, Aug.
- Gil Kalai, 2005, "Noise Sensitivity and Chaos in Social Choice Theory," Discussion Paper Series, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, number dp399, Aug.
- Gersbach, Hans & Siemers, Lars, 2005, "Can Democracy Educate a Society?," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), number 1693, Jul.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005, "Why Do Politicians Delegate?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 11531, Aug.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005, "Controlling firms through the majority voting rule," DULBEA Working Papers, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 05-05.RS., Feb.