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Suspense and Surprise

In: BAYESIAN PERSUASION

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey Ely
  • Alexander Frankel
  • Emir Kamenica

Abstract

We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Ely & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2025. "Suspense and Surprise," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BAYESIAN PERSUASION, chapter 8, pages 177-232, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789819802982_0008
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Persuasion; Economic Theory; Information Economics; Information Design; Disclosure; Game Theory; Strategic Communication; Disclosure Regulation; Persuasion Games; Political Economy; Economic Behavior; Information Revelation; Collusion; Competition; Congestion; Manipulation of Beliefs; Rating Systems; Optimization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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