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Bayesian Persuasion

In: BAYESIAN PERSUASION

Author

Listed:
  • Emir Kamenica
  • Matthew Gentzkow

Abstract

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender’s and the receiver’s preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople.

Suggested Citation

  • Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2025. "Bayesian Persuasion," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BAYESIAN PERSUASION, chapter 1, pages 1-38, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789819802982_0001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Persuasion; Economic Theory; Information Economics; Information Design; Disclosure; Game Theory; Strategic Communication; Disclosure Regulation; Persuasion Games; Political Economy; Economic Behavior; Information Revelation; Collusion; Competition; Congestion; Manipulation of Beliefs; Rating Systems; Optimization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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