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Stable Schedule Matching under Revealed Preference

In: ICM Millennium Lectures on Games

Author

Listed:
  • A. Alkan

    (Sabanci University)

  • D. Gale

    (U. C.)

Abstract

Summary In a recent study Baiou and Balinski [3] generalized the notion of two-sided matching to that of schedule matching which determines not only what partnerships will form but also how much time the partners will spend together. In particular, it is assumed that each agent has a ranking of the agents on the other side of the market. In this paper we treat the scheduling problem using the more general preference structure introduced by Blair [5] and recently refined by Alkan [1, 2], which allows among other things for diversity to be a motivating factor in the choice of partners. The set of stable matchings for this model turns out to be a lattice with other interesting structural properties.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Alkan & D. Gale, 2003. "Stable Schedule Matching under Revealed Preference," Springer Books, in: Leon A. Petrosyan & David W. K. Yeung (ed.), ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, pages 3-19, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_1
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Varun Bansal & Mihir Bhattacharya & Ojasvi Khare, 2026. "Stable Matchings with Choice Correspondences Under Acyclicity," Papers 2603.23038, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
    2. Battal Doğan & Serhat Doğan & Kemal Yıldız, 2021. "On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 856-868, August.
    3. Doğan, Battal & Imamura, Kenzo & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2025. "Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    4. Federico Echenique & Teddy Mekonnen & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026. "Distributional Preferences for Market Design," Papers 2602.08035, arXiv.org.
    5. Vladimir Danilov, 2025. "A short way to the stability," Papers 2511.16104, arXiv.org.

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