Design Principles for Contribution Systems

Contribution systems are emerging as a novel institutional form for coordinating value creation in decentralized communities. Unlike firms or markets, these systems structure participation, recognition, and value accumulation over time, relying on machine-readable contributions and computational governance. This paper develops a framework of design principles for contribution systems, drawing from empirical research on SourceCred, Protocol Guild, Regen Network, and Deep Funding. We build on Kealey and Ricketts’ theory of contribution goods, which conceptualizes value as participation-excludable, in contrast to conventional public goods frameworks. A key governance challenge in contribution systems is achieving and sustaining critical mass—ensuring enough contributors participate for the system to become self-sustaining. Other core principles include tracking dependencies, ensuring continuous valuation, and structuring modular, adaptive governance mechanisms. Contribution systems do not merely reward contributions; they create futural institutions, where contributions persist and recompute dynamically over time. Their programmability allows for automated governance, AI-assisted valuation, and scalable incentive structures, distinguishing them from traditional commons governance. This paper positions contribution systems as an emerging institutional paradigm, offering a set of governance principles that will require further empirical research and testing.