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Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

In: Games in Management Science

Author

Listed:
  • Elena Parilina

    (Saint Petersburg State University)

  • Artem Sedakov

    (Saint Petersburg State University)

Abstract

We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Parilina & Artem Sedakov, 2020. "Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon SiguĂ© & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 381-396, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_21
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21
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