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The Birth of Limit Cycles in Nonlinear Oligopolies with Continuously Distributed Information Lags

In: Modeling Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Carl Chiarella

    (University of Technology Sydney)

  • Ferenc Szidarovszky

    (University of Arizona Tucson)

Abstract

The dynamic behavior of the output in nonlinear oligopolies is examined when the equilibrium is locally unstable. Continuously distributed time lags are assumed in obtaining information about rivals’ output as well as in obtaining or implementing information about the firms’ own output. The Hopf bifurcation theorem is used to find conditions under which limit cycle motion is born. In addition to the classical Cournot model, labor managed and rent seeking oligopolies are also investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Carl Chiarella & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2002. "The Birth of Limit Cycles in Nonlinear Oligopolies with Continuously Distributed Information Lags," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Moshe Dror & Pierre L’Ecuyer & Ferenc Szidarovszky (ed.), Modeling Uncertainty, chapter 0, pages 249-268, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-0-306-48102-4_12
    DOI: 10.1007/0-306-48102-2_12
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiarella, Carl & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2004. "Dynamic oligopolies without full information and with continuously distributed time lags," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 495-511, August.
    2. Anufriev, Mikhail & Kopányi, Dávid, 2018. "Oligopoly game: Price makers meet price takers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 84-103.
    3. Matsumoto, Akio & Chiarella, Carl & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2013. "Dynamic monopoly with bounded continuously distributed delay," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 66-72.

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