IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/csrchp/978-981-13-3510-5_8.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Financial Regulation on Executive Pay in Chinese Banks

In: Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector in China

Author

Listed:
  • Weikang Zou

    (University of International Business and Economics)

Abstract

The regulation on executive pay, as another leg of frame discourses in corporate governance in banking organizations, has drawn special attention ever since the 2007–2009 financial crisis and becomes actually the key of financial reforms across different model countries. It is in this context that this chapter reviews and explores, reflecting upon the implication of varied paradigms and legitimacies as discussed in the previous chapters, the pay regulation in varied model countries, which embraces the theoretical grounds for regulation on executive pay, the different elements in the executive compensation package, and diversified regulatory measures employed by varying model countries. This enables the chapter to continue to study regulation on executive pay in Chinese banking organization, which pertains to the specific composition of the executive remuneration, specialized regulatory mechanisms and arrangements, and increasing coordination between Chinese banks and financial regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Weikang Zou, 2019. "Financial Regulation on Executive Pay in Chinese Banks," CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, in: Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector in China, chapter 0, pages 165-182, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:csrchp:978-981-13-3510-5_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-3510-5_8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:csrchp:978-981-13-3510-5_8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.