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International Peace-Keeping Forces: Economics and Politics

In: The Economics of International Security

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth J. Arrow

Abstract

From 1948 until the present, the UN has engaged in 26 peace-keeping operations. The total cost over that period has been about $8.3 billion (current). In 1992 there were 12 operations under way, for an annual cost of about $2.6 billion.1 This is less than 1 per cent of US military expenditure and probably less than 0.2 per cent of world military expenditure, so it is a trivial fraction of world income. Nevertheless, raising the finances for this operation is not entirely a trivial matter; uncollected contributions from member states equal more than $735 million.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth J. Arrow, 1994. "International Peace-Keeping Forces: Economics and Politics," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Manas Chatterji & Henk Jager & Annemarie Rima (ed.), The Economics of International Security, chapter 9, pages 81-86, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-23695-4_9
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-23695-4_9
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    Cited by:

    1. Ortiz, Cristian & Alvarado, Rafael & Salinas, Aldo, 2019. "The effect of military spending on output: New evidence at the global and country group levels using panel data cointegration techniques," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 402-414.
    2. Caruso Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-55, September.

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