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In Search of a Monetary Constitution for the European Communities

In: One Money for Europe

Author

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  • Michael Parkin

Abstract

The current monetary constitution of the European Communities (EC) is extremely complex. It consists of a set of national laws establishing and delimiting the behaviour of nine Central Banks as well as the relationships between those Banks and their respective national governments. It also consists of a set of laws and regulations concerning the role which may be played in EC member countries by xeno-currencies (most notably the United States dollar). The Community-wide content of the current monetary constitution covers three areas. First, there is a statement of intent in the Rome Treaty to move towards European Monetary Union (EMU) at an unspecified speed and by an unspecified date. Secondly, there already exists a European Unit of Account (EUA) which is used for the purpose of defining Community regulations. Thirdly, there are a series of committees at various levels, including Central Bank Governors, which facilitate the exchange of information on monetary policy and related matters, but which do not make monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Parkin, 1978. "In Search of a Monetary Constitution for the European Communities," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Michele Fratianni & Theo Peeters (ed.), One Money for Europe, chapter 8, pages 167-201, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-04308-8_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-04308-8_8
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    Cited by:

    1. James Forder, 2000. "Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks," Economics Series Working Papers 23, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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