IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/pal/intecp/978-1-349-14540-9_2.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms: Corruption and Learning

In: Contemporary Economic Issues

Author

Listed:
  • Semih Koray

    (Bilkent University)

  • İsmail Sağlam

    (Bilkent University)

Abstract

Regulation can be described as central interference with industrial activities, aiming to achieve social efficiency when it cannot be reached through the market by itself. This area of economics basically deals with the design of artificial rules under which outcomes which otherwise can only be attained through cooperation can be reached through the non-cooperative and decentralized behaviour of agents. Although the theory of regulation can be traced back to Hotelling (1938) and Dupuit (1952), it is only in the past two decades that it gained a crucial impetus through its formulation within the game-theoretic framework of mechanism design. It is even more recently that the principal—agent setting has been employed in this area to treat the asymmetry of information between the regulating and the regulated agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Semih Koray & İsmail Sağlam, 1999. "Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms: Corruption and Learning," International Economic Association Series, in: Murat R. Sertel (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 2, pages 30-48, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-14540-9_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ismail Saglam, 2024. "The Bayesian approach to monopoly regulation after 40 years," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 108-136, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-14540-9_2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.