Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy
In: Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy
The EC policy of import surveillance entails the public announcement that henceforth the Commission will collect detailed statistics on particular import flows. The imposition of surveillance, it is argued, will change exporters' perceptions about the probabilities of future import controls. When it anticipates future restrictions, a competitive export industry is likely to increase sales as each firm tries to gain a higher share of any future quota, but an oligopolistic industry may well curtail exports in the hope of avoiding further, more restrictive policy. This paper tests these hypotheses on EC import data and finds them largely supported. It argues that this result constitutes evidence of strategic behaviour.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number
8682.||Handle:|| RePEc:nbr:nberch:8682||Contact details of provider:|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8682. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.