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Schumpeterian political economy and Downsian public choice: alternative economic theories of democracy

In: Law and the State

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  • Michael Wohlgemuth

Abstract

Law and the State provides a political economy analysis of the legal functioning of a democratic state, illustrating how it builds on informational and legal constraints. It explains, in an organised and thematic fashion, how competitive information enhances democracy while strategic information endangers it, and discusses how legal constraints stress the dilemma of independence versus discretion for judges as well as the elusive role of administrators and experts.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Wohlgemuth, 2005. "Schumpeterian political economy and Downsian public choice: alternative economic theories of democracy," Chapters, in: Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin (ed.), Law and the State, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3398_2
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    Cited by:

    1. Pál Czeglédi, 2020. "The consistency of market beliefs as a determinant of economic freedom," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 227-258, June.

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