Values of non-transferable utility games
In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n-person games without transferable utility -- NTU games for short -- that are based on varying notions of "fair division". An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of action. The players confront the problem of choosing a payoff or solution that is feasible for the group as a whole. This is a bargaining problem and its solution may be reasonably required to satisfy various criteria, and different sets of rules or axioms will characterize different solutions or classes of solutions. For transferable utility games, the main axiomatic solution is the Shapley Value and this chapter deals with values of NTU games, i.e., solutions for NTU games that coincide with the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. We survey axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley NTU value, the Harsanyi solution, the Egalitarian solution and the non-symmetric generalizations of each. In addition, we discuss approaches to some of these solutions using the notions of potential and consistency for NTU games with finitely many as well as infinitely many players.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number
3-55.||Handle:|| RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-55||Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.