Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure: Structure, Performance, and Investment Opportunities
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References listed on IDEAS
- James H. Anderson & Georges Korsun & Peter Murrell, 1999. "Ownership, exit and voice after mass privatization," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 215-243, March.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000.
"Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eytan Sheshinski & Luis F. López-Calva, 2003. "Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(3), pages 429-459.
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