- Peter Cramton() (University of Maryland)Yoav Shoham() (Stanford University)Richard Steinberg() (University of Cambridge)Registered editor(s):
The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of items or "packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics, operations research, and computer science. This landmark collection integrates these three perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of developments in combinatorial auction theory and practice by leaders in the field. Combinatorial auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their preferences more fully, can lead to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. However, challenges arise in both design and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses each of these challenges. After describing and analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses bidding languages and questions of efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the computationally intractable problem of how to compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known as the winner determination problem) are considered, as are questions of how to test alternative algorithms. The book discusses five important applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight transportation services, the London bus routes market, and industrial procurement. This unique collection makes recent work in CAs available to a broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The integration of work from the three disciplines underlying CAs, using a common language throughout, serves to advance the field in theory and practice.
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- Kazuo Murota & Akiyoshi Shioura & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "Time Bounds for Iterative Auctions: A Unified Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis," Discussion Papers 14/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
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- Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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- Vohra, Rakesh V., 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 455-476 Elsevier.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015.
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CARF-F-359, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-960, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Paul Milgrom, 2009.
"Assignment Messages and Exchanges,"
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"Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
14765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wada, Kentaro & Akamatsu, Takashi, 2013. "A hybrid implementation mechanism of tradable network permits system which obviates path enumeration: An auction mechanism with day-to-day capacity control," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 94-112.
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