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Trajectoires carbone en Europe à l'horizon 2050 sous une stabilisation mondiale à 450 ppmv CO2-équivalent : réductions, valeurs carbone et coûts d'abattement optimaux

Editor

Listed:
  • Keppler, Jan Horst

Author

Listed:
  • Davoust, Romain

Abstract

Global warming will be a major issue in the 21st century. Limiting temperature increase to +2⁰C above pre-industrial levels should help to preserve ecosystems. According to current estimates, this sustainable development objective requires a stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) concentrations at 450 ppmv CO2-equivalent. Over the next decade, the world should reduce its GHG emissions by a factor 2 compared to 1990 levels. Europe has committed to reduce its Greenhouse Gases emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 1990 and by 30% in case of a fair international agreement. In the long term, EU is targeting an abatement of at least 80% by 2050, which is a required level under the 450 ppmv CO2-equivalent constraint. The thesis models carbon effort in Europe to reach -80% GHG by 2050. Over the projection, the OCTET model (Optimal Carbon Trajectories for Emission Targets) projects a set of temporally optimal CO2 pathways. Efficient reduction strategies are built for the next decades (2020, 2030, 2040) depending on international uncertainty. The thesis calculates carbon price profiles in Europe under a factor 5 reduction as well as reduction costs. In a word, this thesis seeks to explore the implications of a low-carbon European society and to advise the European abatement policy over the 2050 horizon.

Suggested Citation

  • Davoust, Romain, 2011. "Trajectoires carbone en Europe à l'horizon 2050 sous une stabilisation mondiale à 450 ppmv CO2-équivalent : réductions, valeurs carbone et coûts d'abattement optimaux," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7235 edited by Keppler, Jan Horst.
  • Handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/7235 Note: dissertation
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Réchauffement Climatique; Optimisation Intertemporelle; Modélisation Environnementale; Coût de Réduction; Prix du Carbone; Réduction de CO2; Développement Durable; Intertemporal Optimisation; Environmental Modeling; Reduction Cost; Carbon Price; CO2 Abatement; Europe; Sustainable Development; Global Warming;

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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