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L'équilibre des parties dans le contrat de franchise


  • May, Jean-Claude


  • El Zeenni, Antonio


Franchising is a contract that is not always balanced. This is due to a relationship where one can find a party, usually the franchisor, dominating the contractual bond. The economic and legal relationships call for much more attention due to the massive investments involved. One will often notice the franchisee being subject to many economic, technical and legal constraints that are practically exaggerated if not unjustified. This is certainly not without any solution. This study attempts to find remedies to the problems raised by this game of domination through examining the contract as well as its various components. The followed method consists of, primarily, the examination of the concept behind each element in this precise contractual framework, to then go back to the definition of franchising, as well as its object; all in light of the concept of equilibrium in order to restore some equality of principle in accordance with the requirements of contractual justice.Definitions, criteria, solutions, and amendments are proposed to serve this purpose.

Suggested Citation

  • El Zeenni, Antonio, 2013. "L'équilibre des parties dans le contrat de franchise," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/12222 edited by May, Jean-Claude, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/12222
    Note: dissertation

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Michel Grignon & Marc Perronnin & John N. Lavis, 2008. "Does free complementary health insurance help the poor to access health care? Evidence from France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 203-219.
    2. Sandy Tubeuf & Florence Jusot & Marion Devaux & Catherine Sermet, 2008. "Social heterogeneity in self-reported health status and measurement of inequalities in health," Working Papers DT12, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jun 2008.
    3. Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnès Couffinhal & Michel Grignon & Marc Perronnin, 2004. "Access to physician services: does supplemental insurance matter? Evidence from France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(7), pages 669-687.
    4. Dourgnon, Paul & Naiditch, Michel, 2010. "The preferred doctor scheme: A political reading of a French experiment of Gate-keeping," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 129-134, February.
    5. Paul Dourgnon & Florence Jusot & Romain Fantin, 2012. "Payer peut nuire à votre santé : une étude de l’impact du renoncement financier aux soins sur l’état de santé," Working Papers DT47, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Apr 2012.
    6. Eddy van Doorslaer & Xander Koolman & Andrew M. Jones, 2004. "Explaining income-related inequalities in doctor utilisation in Europe," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(7), pages 629-647.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12236 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7004 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Allin, Sara & Grignon, Michel & Le Grand, Julian, 2010. "Subjective unmet need and utilization of health care services in Canada: What are the equity implications?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 465-472, February.
    10. Groot, Wim, 2000. "Adaptation and scale of reference bias in self-assessments of quality of life," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-420, May.
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