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The Limits of Leviathan

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  • Scott,Robert E.
  • Stephan,Paul B.

Abstract

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott,Robert E. & Stephan,Paul B., 2006. "The Limits of Leviathan," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521858465.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521858465
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    Cited by:

    1. Tom Ginsburg, 2009. "International delegation and state disaggregation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 323-340, September.
    2. Scott Baker & Mitu Gulati, 2009. ""Make or Buy" and International Law. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 134-141, March.
    3. Jesse L. Reynolds, 2019. "An economic analysis of international environmental rights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 557-575, December.

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