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Optimale Regulierung von Netzbetreibern unter Berücksichtigung der Netzqualität


  • Claudia Kriehn


Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie ist die optimale Regulierung des Betriebs von Netzwerken, die die Charakteristika eines natürlichen Monopols aufweisen. Während bei der Nutzung solcher Netzwerke Wettbewerb zwischen verschiedenen Anbietern netzbasierter Dienstleistungen errichtet werden kann, ist dies im Hinblick auf die Bereitstellung des Netzwerks selbst nicht sinnvoll. Für eine optimale Regulierung des Verhaltens des jeweiligen Netzwerkbetreibers ist dabei entscheidend, welche Handlungsparameter ihm zur Verfügung stehen. Während in der Literatur vorrangig Mengen- und Preiseffekte von Marktstruktur und Regulierung betrachtet werden, werden hier die oft vernachlässigten Effekte auf die Qualität des Netzwerks in den Vordergrund gestellt. Dies hat weit reichende Folgen für die Bewertung gängiger Regulierungsinstrumente.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Kriehn, 2004. "Optimale Regulierung von Netzbetreibern unter Berücksichtigung der Netzqualität," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 16, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifobei:16

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    More about this item


    Netzwerk; Wettbewerb; Natürliches Monopol; Wohlfahrtstheorie; Second Best; Regulierung; Preis; Produktqualität;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy


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