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How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

Author

Listed:
  • Jie Lu

    (School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China)

  • Peipei Zhang

    (#x2020;School of Physics and Electronic Engineering, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China)

  • Dandan Li

    (School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P. R. China)

Abstract

To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain T or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals m would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jie Lu & Peipei Zhang & Dandan Li, 2021. "How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 32(10), pages 1-12, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:32:y:2021:i:10:n:s0129183121501394
    DOI: 10.1142/S0129183121501394
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Peipei & Li, Dandan, 2023. "A generalized public goods game model based on Nash bargaining," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 609(C).
    2. Li, Dandan & Sun, Xiaoxiao & He, Youxin & Han, Dun, 2022. "On prisoner’s dilemma game with psychological bias and memory learning," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 433(C).

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