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The Concert Queueing Game: Fluid Regime with Random Order Service

Author

Listed:
  • Sandeep Juneja

    (School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, HB Road, Colaba, Mumbai-400 005, India)

  • Tushar Raheja

    (Department of Mechanical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, Hauz Khas, New Delhi-110 016, India)

Abstract

The concert queueing problem corresponds to determining the equilibrium arrival profile of non-cooperative customers selecting their arrival times to a queue where the service opens at a specified time. The customers are allowed to arrive before or after this time. This problem has a variety of queuing applications including how people queue at airport, movie theaters, passport offices, ration lines, etc. This also captures the settings where large computational jobs are sent to servers that open for service at a specified time. Substantial literature is devoted to studying the more tractable fluid version of this problem, that is, each customer is considered an infinitesimal particle, resulting in a non-atomic game between customers. This allows for explicit determination of the unique equilibrium arrival profile in many such settings as well as the associated socially optimal centralized solution. The knowledge of both then allows the computation of price of anarchy (PoA) in the system. The literature thus far focuses on queues with the first come first serve (FCFS) service discipline. In this paper, we again consider the fluid regime and extend the analysis to the case where the service discipline is random order service (ROS). This is equivalent to the practically equally important processor sharing regime when the service times are exponential. The latter is relevant in computational settings while the former is a good approximation to settings where a customer is selected more or less at random by the server.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Juneja & Tushar Raheja, 2015. "The Concert Queueing Game: Fluid Regime with Random Order Service," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(02), pages 1-15.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:02:n:s0219198915400125
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915400125
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ravner, Liron & Haviv, Moshe & Vu, Hai L., 2016. "A strategic timing of arrivals to a linear slowdown processor sharing system," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 255(2), pages 496-504.
    2. Moshe Haviv & Liron Ravner, 2021. "A survey of queueing systems with strategic timing of arrivals," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 163-198, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Queueing games; Nash equilibrium; random order service; processor sharing; fluid queues; 91A10; 91A13; 91A80;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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