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Average Rules For Cooperative Tu Games

Author

Listed:
  • A. SUGUMARAN

    (Department of Mathematics, Government Arts College, Thiruvalluvar University, Tiruvannamalai, 606 603, India)

  • V. THANGARAJ

    (School of Mathematics, Vel Tech University, Avadi, Chennai - 600 062, India)

  • G. RAVINDRAN

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai Centre, MGR Knowledge City, CIT Campus, Taramani, Chennai, 600 113, India)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new single valued rule based on the concept of fair division for all cooperative transferable utility (TU) games. In any cooperative TU game, primarily the coalitions that are likely to form are identified and each such coalition is fixed with a payoff vector based on the notion of fairness. The value of the single valued rule is obtained from the collection of all coalition structures consisting of the coalitions that are likely to form. The uniqueness of the new rule is followed by its existence and computational simplicity for all TU games. Finally, a linear average rule is defined, and some of its properties are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Sugumaran & V. Thangaraj & G. Ravindran, 2013. "Average Rules For Cooperative Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(04), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:04:n:s0219198913400276
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400276
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2017. "The procedural egalitarian solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 179-187.
    2. Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2018. "Egalitarian allocation principles," Other publications TiSEM 01be3135-efa6-4f51-b2ef-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strongly dominating coalition; coalition structure; normalized weighted average value; 91A05; 91A06; 91A12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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