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When To Ratify An Environmental Agreement: The Case Of High Seas Fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • VEIJO KAITALA

    (Department of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, P.O. Box 65, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland)

  • MARKO LINDROOS

    (Department of Economics and Management, P.O. Box 27 00014, University of Helsinki, Finland)

Abstract

We investigate in this paper the optimal timing of cooperative agreements dealing with the harvesting, utilisation or management of marine fish resources. We formulate the optimal timing problem as a two-player dynamic differential game model where both players, e.g. harvesting countries, consider the timing of the agreement as a strategic decision parameter. In other words, the initialisation of the environmental agreement will be subjected to negotiations. The game begins by a period during which the players negotiate on the cooperative agreement. During this period the players optimize their fishing unilaterally, that is, they play a non-cooperative game taking into account that they will enter a cooperative fishery some time later. It is up to the players to decide when they wish to initiate cooperation. We show that there are several possibilities where cooperation is never an option for at least one of the countries. In other cases immediate cooperation may be optimal for both countries. Between these extreme cases is the possibility of some delay in entering cooperation. The determinants of willingness to cooperate in the game include unit costs of harvesting, discount rate, maximum fishing efforts, initial stock size, biological growth rate, carrying capacity and division of profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Veijo Kaitala & Marko Lindroos, 2004. "When To Ratify An Environmental Agreement: The Case Of High Seas Fisheries," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(01), pages 55-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:06:y:2004:i:01:n:s0219198904000071
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000071
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    2. Toumasatos, Evangelos & Sandal, Leif Kristoffer & Steinshamn, Stein Ivar, 2022. "Keep it in house or sell it abroad? A framework to evaluate fairness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(2), pages 709-728.
    3. Stelios Rozakis & Athanasios Kampas, 2022. "An interactive multi-criteria approach to admit new members in international environmental agreements," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 3461-3487, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental agreements; ratification; cooperative agreements; fisheries; differential games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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