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Nash Equilibria From The Correlated Equilibria Viewpoint

Author

Listed:
  • SABRINA GOMEZ CANOVAS

    (École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de Génie Industriel, Succursale Centre Ville CP 6079, Canada, H3C 3A7, Canada)

  • PIERRE HANSEN

    (GERAD & Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Département des Méthodes Quantitatives en Gestion, 3000 chemin de la Côte Sainte Catherine, Montréal, Canada, H3T 2A7, Canada)

  • BRIGITTE JAUMARD

    (GERAD & École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de Génie Industriel, Succursale Centre Ville CP 6079, Canada, H3C 3A7, Canada)

Abstract

We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Sabrina Gomez Canovas & Pierre Hansen & Brigitte Jaumard, 1999. "Nash Equilibria From The Correlated Equilibria Viewpoint," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(01), pages 33-44.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:01:y:1999:i:01:n:s0219198999000049
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000049
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    Cited by:

    1. Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2019. "On the Geometry of Nash and Correlated Equilibria with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 142-156, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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