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Retailer Information Sharing Strategy with Counterfeiter Encroachment

Author

Listed:
  • Mingzhu Yu

    (Institute of Big Data Intelligent Management and Decision, College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China)

  • Qi Gao

    (China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, Yungang West Road 17, Fengtai District, Beijing, 100074, P. R. China)

  • Zelong Yi

    (Department of Transportation Economics and Logistics Management, College of Economics, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the retailer’s information sharing decision in an authentic supply chain with a single supplier and a single retailer under different counterfeiter encroachment situations. We propose a Stackelberg game model to analyze the optimal wholesale price of the supplier, the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal production quantity of the counterfeiter. We obtain the information sharing strategies of the retailer and analyze the impact of the counterfeiter on the authentic supply chain. It is revealed that: (1) under certain conditions, the retailer will voluntarily share information with the upstream supplier and (2) the existence of the counterfeiter may increase the profit of the authentic supply chain.

Suggested Citation

  • Mingzhu Yu & Qi Gao & Zelong Yi, 2024. "Retailer Information Sharing Strategy with Counterfeiter Encroachment," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 41(01), pages 1-52, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:apjorx:v:41:y:2024:i:01:n:s021759592350001x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021759592350001X
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