IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wri/journl/v40y2017i1p23-60.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry

Author

Listed:
  • David M. Pooser
  • Ping Wang
  • James Barrese

Abstract

This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak risk†bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEO†Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is sub†optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance.

Suggested Citation

  • David M. Pooser & Ping Wang & James Barrese, 2017. "A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Insurance Issues, Western Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 23-60.
  • Handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:40:y:2017:i:1:p:23-60
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.insuranceissues.org/PDFs/401PWB.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Killins, Robert N., 2020. "Firm-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors of life insurers’ profitability: Evidence from Canada," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:40:y:2017:i:1:p:23-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (James Barrese). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.