Strategic Blockchain Adoption and Supply Chain Finance: A Game‐Theoretic Approach With Risk Aversion Analysis

Blockchain technology holds significant potential for fostering trust in supply chains. The investigation of blockchain technology investments and the evaluation of their efficiency are critical for improving operational performance. This study develops a two‐stage game model involving a supplier and two competitive retailers; the retailers may face financial constraints. They can obtain financing through either bank finance or supply chain finance (SCF). In the benchmark model, SCF emerges as the sole equilibrium, potentially resulting in a prisoner's dilemma. Then we adopt partial and entire blockchain adoption models (model PB and model EB) in which the impact of blockchain technology on demand is considered. Equilibrium conditions are derived for both retailers' selection of SCF. Furthermore, comparative static analyses demonstrate the superiority of model PB in guiding blockchain adoption investment decisions. Numerical analysis also reveals that the bank's risk aversion level significantly influences its blockchain investment strategy. And differentiated compensating balances effectively distinguish retailers and optimize financing decisions. This paper provides a framework for banks to better assess the risks associated with loans to supply chain, establishing more robust risk evaluation mechanisms. It also offers theoretical and practical insights for supply chain managers in determining optimal blockchain adoption strategies under financial constraints.