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Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

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  • Luciano Fanti
  • Nicola Meccheri

Abstract

In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2019. "Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(7), pages 845-857, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:7:p:845-857
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3050
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    Cited by:

    1. Cong Pan & DongJoon Lee & Kangsik Choi, 2020. "Firms’ strategic delegation with heterogeneous consumers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 199-221, December.

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