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Notorious murders, black lanterns, & moveable goods: the transformation of Edinburgh's underworld in the early nineteenth century, by Symonds, D. A., Series on International Political and Economic History, University of Akron Press: Akron, OH; 2006, xiv+180pp., USD 39.95 (cloth)

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  • William F. Shughart

    (Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, P. O. Box 1848 University, MS 38677-1848, USA)

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  • William F. Shughart, 2007. "Notorious murders, black lanterns, & moveable goods: the transformation of Edinburgh's underworld in the early nineteenth century, by Symonds, D. A., Series on International Political and Economic His," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 169-170.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:169-170 DOI: 10.1002/mde.1363
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
    2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    3. Michel Cavagnac, 2005. "Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(8), pages 499-512.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    6. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    7. Nolan Miller & Amit Pazgal, 2002. "Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 51-68.
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