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Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best?

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Manzini
  • Marco Mariotti

Abstract

There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be ‘tricked' into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2018. "Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 827-844, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:609:p:827-844
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12425
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    Cited by:

    1. Schlatterer, Markus & Saur, Marc & Schmitt, Stefanie, 2019. "Horizontal product differentiation with limited attentive consumers," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203571, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Rozzi, Roberto & Schmitt, Stefanie Y., 2024. "Vertical product differentiation, prominence, and costly search," BERG Working Paper Series 190, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    3. Schmitt, Stefanie Y., 2022. "Competition with limited attention to quality differences," BERG Working Paper Series 184, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    4. Saur, Marc P. & Schlatterer, Markus G. & Schmitt, Stefanie Y., 2022. "Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 151-168.
    5. Saur, Marc P. & Schlatterer, Markus G. & Schmitt, Stefanie Yvonne, 2019. "Horizontal product differentiation with limited attentive consumers," BERG Working Paper Series 143, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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