IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/buseth/v35y2026i3p1988-2012.html

Does Audit Committee Chairs' Collectivism Matter? The Impact of Rice Culture on Financial Fraud

Author

Listed:
  • Li Chen
  • Yingwen Guo

Abstract

This paper investigates whether audit committee (AC) chairs' collectivism has an impact on corporate financial frauds. Based on the rice theory of culture, we identify the AC chairs born in rice‐planting regions as those from collectivist cultures. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2019, we find that firms with collectivist AC chairs are less likely to commit financial frauds. This result suggests that collectivism motivates AC chairs to focus on organizational interests and curb managerial misconduct in financial reporting at the expense of shareholders' wealth. This effect is strengthened by AC chairs' tenure, accounting expertise, and reputation. Further analysis suggests that collectivistic AC chairs enhance internal control quality, hire a more competent auditor, and exhibit greater risk aversion. Moreover, the relationship is more salient when the AC chairs share the same culture with the CEO or when other AC members also have collectivistic tendencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Chen & Yingwen Guo, 2026. "Does Audit Committee Chairs' Collectivism Matter? The Impact of Rice Culture on Financial Fraud," Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(3), pages 1988-2012, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:buseth:v:35:y:2026:i:3:p:1988-2012
    DOI: 10.1111/beer.70024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.70024
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/beer.70024?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:buseth:v:35:y:2026:i:3:p:1988-2012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/26946424 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.