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Monitoring Legal Compliance: The Growth of Compliance Committees

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  • Sara Melendy
  • Ronald J. Huefner

Abstract

The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO) framework outlines three objectives of internal control. This paper addresses the third and least emphasized component, compliance with laws and regulations. We address the growing importance of board‐level oversight of legal compliance and the emerging role of a separate board committee dedicated to the compliance function. A recent COSO project emphasizes the importance of the monitoring function; COSO observes that many companies are not conducting this function effectively. We examine the use of a board‐level compliance committee to monitor legal compliance. We also discuss the roles of corporate counsel and internal auditors in assisting with monitoring. Our results show that over the last 15 years a growing percentage of S&P 500 firms have adopted a board‐level compliance committee. Internal auditors’ specialized training and expertise in the areas of monitoring and prevention would complement the company’s legal expertise and be of significant value to boards of directors in helping them fulfill their compliance oversight responsibilities. Le contrôle de conformitÉ aux lois: la croissance des comitÉs de conformitÉ RÉSUMÉ Le cadre de référence du Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) décrit trois objectifs du contrôle interne. Les auteurs se penchent sur le troisième de ces objectifs, le plus négligé d’entre eux : la conformité aux lois et aux règlements. Ils étudient l’importance croissante de la surveillance de la conformité aux lois exercée à l’échelon du conseil d’administration et le rôle en émergence d’un comité distinct émanant du conseil d’administration, chargé d’assurer cette surveillance. Un projet récent du COSO souligne l’importance de la fonction de contrôle. Or, selon les observations du COSO, maintes sociétés ne s’acquittent pas de cette fonction avec efficacité. Les auteurs s’intéressent au recours à un comité de conformitéémanant du conseil pour contrôler la conformité aux lois. Ils analysent également les rôles des conseillers juridiques d’entreprises et des auditeurs internes à ce chapitre. Les résultats de leur étude révèlent qu’au cours des 15 dernières années, un pourcentage croissant de sociétés du palmarès S&P 500 ont créé un comité de conformitéémanant du conseil. La formation et les compétences spécialisées des auditeurs internes dans les domaines du contrôle et de la prévention compléteraient les compétences juridiques de l’entreprise et seraient un précieux atout pour les conseils d’administration dans l’exercice de leurs responsabilités en matière de surveillance de la conformité.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Melendy & Ronald J. Huefner, 2011. "Monitoring Legal Compliance: The Growth of Compliance Committees," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 241-263, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:10:y:2011:i:4:p:241-263
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3838.2011.00026.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chun-Keung (Stan) Hoi & Ashok Robin & Daniel Tessoni, 2007. "Sarbanes-Oxley: are audit committees up to the task?," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 22(3), pages 255-267, March.
    2. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2010. "Performance-Based Incentives for Internal Monitors," Research Papers 2052, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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