Between Tunneling and Efficiency – A Global Empirical Review of the Impact of Related-Party Transactions (RPT) on Subsidiary Performance

Objective The purpose of this article is to provide a review of the empirical scientific literature concerning the impact of Related-Party Transactions (RPTs) on subsidiary performance from an intercontinental perspective. The goal is to identify common patterns, regional differences resulting from institutional context, and key determinants of RPT effects. Methodology The article reviews empirical literature published between 2009 and 2025, incorporating classic theoretical positions. The analysis is organized regionally, sorting results across four main areas: Asia, Europe, Africa, and North and Latin America. Findings The RPT impact is ambivalent, driven by three factors: governance quality, ownership structure (the control/profit wedge), and motivation. Asia and Latin America demonstrate the coexistence of tunneling (expropriation) and propping (support), often utilizing RPTs as a capital market substitute. Europe and North America primarily use RPTs for tax optimization due to stricter regulations and developed markets. Value Added This review provides a comparative, balanced assessment of RPT influence. Its value lies in the synthetic intercontinental analysis and the integration of the conflict, efficiency, and resource theories, leading to the identification of the three main determinants of RPT effects. Recommendations Subsidiaries must implement procedures for assessing the arm’s length nature of RPTs and strengthen board monitoring. Regulators should harmonize regulations and continue implementing OECD BEPS initiatives to limit tax base erosion. Future studies should focus on long-term RPT effects on investment and financial stability.