Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does Corporatism Matter?
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- Jane Bogoev & Goran Petrevski & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "Investigating the Link Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 78-96, July.
- Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 611-652.
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Keywordsinflation; central bank independence; corporatism; wage bargaining;
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
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