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Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does Corporatism Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Sergio DESTEFANIS

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Universita' degli Studi di Salerno)

  • Maria Olivella RIZZA

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Universita' degli Studi di Cassino)

Abstract

In this paper we test the hypothesis that central bank independence is closely correlated to social agreement about decisions on income distribution. Using data from a panel of OECD countries over the period 1972-2002 and controlling for several macroeconomic factors, we find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. When some indexes of corporatism are used to allow for the degree of social agreement on income distribution and its determination, the relationship between inflation and CBI weakens considerably. This evidence is consistent with the mechanism posited in Pittaluga - Cama (2004) according to which society formally endows the central bank with independence in order to safeguard a key principle of democracy, namely that decision-makers should be clearly responsible for their choices and actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio DESTEFANIS & Maria Olivella RIZZA, 2007. "Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does Corporatism Matter?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(4), pages 477-502.
  • Handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2007:v:115:i:4:p:477-502
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jane Bogoev & Goran Petrevski & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "Investigating the Link Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 78-96, July.
    2. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 611-652.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation; central bank independence; corporatism; wage bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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