Wage-Homestead Tenancies: Technological Dualism and Tenant Household Size
A widespread but little-studied tenancy in the developing world entails the exchange of labor for access to a homestead and a wage. This paper models two distinguishing features of this tenancy: technological dualism between the landlord's and tenants' plot, and landlord preferences over tenant household size. When wages are time denominated, moral hazard may provide incentive for landlords to resist innovation on the homestead. Landlords are shown to prefer larger tenant households under a time wage than under piece-rate. I argue that landlord preferences over tenant household size may have important effects that are ignored in the literature.
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