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Seguro obligatorio de responsabilidad civil. Ensayo sobre instituciones en mrcados imperfectos

Author

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  • Hugo Acciarri
  • Andrea Barbero
  • Andrea Castellano

Abstract

The study of mandatory insurance systems may be carried out on two different levels. On the one hand, it is possible to analyze theoretical relations between some properties or elements belonging to that class of systems. On the other, given a set of relevant conditions, empirical outcomes of individual systems can be foreseen. This work studies a few theoretical relations between some fine-grained elements of mandatory insurance systems underlying the obligation to purchase coverage, from a transaction costs perspective. We conclude that, in relation to a set of empirical conditions typically related to developing societies, it is possible to find relatively preferable an individual system including that kind of obligation. However, this statement does not mean that every individual systems imposing mandatory insurance are adequate for that type of real realms, or that the duty of insuring should be discarded for societies of a different kind

Suggested Citation

  • Hugo Acciarri & Andrea Barbero & Andrea Castellano, 2009. "Seguro obligatorio de responsabilidad civil. Ensayo sobre instituciones en mrcados imperfectos," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, vol. 26(52), pages 1-27, january-j.
  • Handle: RePEc:uns:esteco:v:26:y:2009:i:52:p:1-27
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    File URL: http://revistas.uns.edu.ar/ee/article/view/794/463
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    responsabilidad civil; seguros; información mperfecta;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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