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Disequilibrium Play in Tennis

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Anderson
  • Jeremy Rosen
  • John Rust
  • Kin-Ping Wong

Abstract

Do the world’s best tennis pros play Nash equilibrium mixed strategies? We answer this question using data on serve-direction choices (to the receiver’s left, right, or body) from the Match Charting Project. Using a new approach, we test and reject a key implication of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: that the probability of winning the service game is identical for all possible serve strategies. We calculate best-response serve strategies by dynamic programming (DP) and show that for most elite pro servers, the DP strategy significantly increases their win probability relative to the mixed strategies they actually use.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Anderson & Jeremy Rosen & John Rust & Kin-Ping Wong, 2025. "Disequilibrium Play in Tennis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(1), pages 190-251.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/732529
    DOI: 10.1086/732529
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    2. Wu, Tong & Lawell, C.Y. Cynthia Lin & Just, David R. & Zhao, Jiancheng & Fei, Zhangjun & Wei, Qiang, 2022. "Optimal Forest Management for Interdependent Products: A Nested Dynamic Bioeconomic Model and Application to Bamboo," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322164, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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