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The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Egan
  • Gregor Matvos
  • Amit Seru

Abstract

We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in misconduct coexist with firms that have clean records. We show that this phenomenon may be explained by some firms “specializing” in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Egan & Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, 2019. "The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 233-295.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/700735
    DOI: 10.1086/700735
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    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection

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