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Identifying Partisan Gerrymandering and Its Consequences: Evidence from the 1990 US Census Redistricting

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  • Navid Sabet
  • Noam Yuchtman

Abstract

We empirically identify politically motivated redistricting and its consequences, studying the effects of changed electorate composition on US congressional district boundaries and on political outcomes. We exploit the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which legalized millions of immigrants, changing local electorates without changing demographics—legalized immigrants were already counted in the census. Where Democrats controlled the 1990 redistricting process, higher IRCA populations were associated with more spatially distorted districts. Consistent with theory, Democrats packed Hispanics (their ardent supporters) into majority-minority districts. House delegations had more Hispanics, suggesting that partisan gerrymandering, in this case, increased representation among the historically underrepresented.

Suggested Citation

  • Navid Sabet & Noam Yuchtman, 2025. "Identifying Partisan Gerrymandering and Its Consequences: Evidence from the 1990 US Census Redistricting," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 649-690.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/733776
    DOI: 10.1086/733776
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    Cited by:

    1. Sabet, Navid & Winter, Christoph, 2024. "Immigrant legalization and the redistribution of state funds: Evidence from the 1986 IRCA," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General

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