IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/doi10.1086-691243.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws against Domestic and Foreign Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Cremieux
  • Edward A. Snyder

Abstract

Antitrust authorities must decide whether and how to consider the national identities of firms. Authorities may follow a neutral enforcement approach or focus on either foreign or domestic firms. We investigate these issues in the context of cartel enforcement against EU, US, and rest-of-the-world (ROW) firms by the European Union and the United States--the two jurisdictions with the longest and most robust enforcement histories. Our results suggest a mix of behaviors. The European Union is more likely to fine domestic and ROW firms than US firms, and the United States is no more likely to fine EU firms than domestic firms but disproportionately targets ROW firms. With respect to the size of fines, EU enforcement outcomes show no significant differences among categories of firms. The United States, however, levies significantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms, whether from the European Union or the rest of the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cremieux & Edward A. Snyder, 2016. "Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws against Domestic and Foreign Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 775-803.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/691243
    DOI: 10.1086/691243
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691243
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691243
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/691243?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2023. "Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 155-186, September.
    2. Garz, Marcel & Maaß, Sabrina, 2021. "Cartels in the European Union, antitrust action, and public attention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 533-547.
    3. Clougherty, Joseph A. & Zhang, Nan, 2023. "Antitrust policy and inward FDI: The impact of policy risk and uncertainty on U.S. inward-FDI flows," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(4).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/691243. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.