Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure
Firms often view job applicant referrals from current employees as more informative than direct applications or referrals through formal labor market intermediaries such as placement firms. The authors argue that old boy networks reduce employers' uncertainty about worker productivity. Using Jovanovic's job matching model, they show that workers hired through the old boy network should (1) earn higher initial salaries, (2) experience lower subsequent wage growth on the job, and (3) stay on the job longer than otherwise comparable workers hired from outside the network. They find considerable support for this theory using data from the 1972 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
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