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Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts

Author

Listed:
  • Boris van Leeuwen

    (Department of Economics, Tilburg University)

  • Theo Offerman

    (CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)

  • Jeroen van de Ven

    (ASE, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)

Abstract

We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a "deterrence value" on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris van Leeuwen & Theo Offerman & Jeroen van de Ven, 2022. "Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 217-231, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:104:y:2022:i:2:p:217-231
    DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00961
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