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Alfred Marshall Lecture Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and Politics

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Listed:
  • Marco Pagano
  • Paolo Volpin

Abstract

This paper presents a political economy model in which there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder base and increases support for shareholder protection. This feedback loop can generate multiple equilibria, with investor protection and stock market size being positively correlated across equilibria. The model's predictions are tested on panel data for 47 countries over 1993-2002, controlling for country and year effects and endogeneity issues. We also document international convergence in shareholder protection to best-practice standards, and show that it is correlated with cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity, consistent with the model. (JEL: G34, K22, K42) (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2006. "Alfred Marshall Lecture Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 315-341, 04-05.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:4:y:2006:i:2-3:p:315-341
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ulrike Malmendier, 2009. "Law and Finance "at the Origin"," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1076-1108, December.
    2. Korkeamaki, Timo & Koskinen, Yrjo & Takalo, Tuomas, 2007. "Phoenix rising: Legal reforms and changes in valuations in Finland during the economic crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 33-58, April.
    3. Massimiliano Vatiero, 2017. "On The (Political) Origin Of ‘Corporate Governance’ Species," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 393-409, April.
    4. Ye Bai & Christopher Green, 2011. "Determinants of cross-sectional stock return variations in emerging markets," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 81-102, August.
    5. Bonfiglioli, Alessandra, 2012. "Investor protection and income inequality: Risk sharing vs risk taking," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 92-104.
    6. Croci, Ettore & Petmezas, Dimitris, 2010. "Minority shareholders' wealth effects and stock market development: Evidence from increase-in-ownership M&As," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 681-694, March.
    7. Perotti, Enrico & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2009. "The political origin of pension funding," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 384-404, July.
    8. Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit Singh, 2010. "Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 325-346, March.
    9. Laura Rondi & Julie Ann Elston, 2009. "Corporate Governance And Capital Accumulation: Firm-Level Evidence From Italy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(5), pages 634-661, November.
    10. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Persson, Lars & Tåg, Joacim, 2016. "The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market: On the Political Economy Consequences of Excessive Delistings," Working Paper Series 1115, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 01 Feb 2018.
    11. Bill Francis & Eric Ofori, 2015. "Political regimes and stock market development," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(1), pages 111-137, June.
    12. Alexander Ljungqvist & Lars Persson & Joacim Tåg, 2016. "Private Equity's Unintended Dark Side: On the Economic Consequences of Excessive Delistings," NBER Working Papers 21909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2014. "The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 247-261.
    14. Saibal Ghosh, 2016. "Small business, lending relationships and crisis: evidence from Indian micro data," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 43(1), pages 1-15, March.
    15. Ashok Thomas & Luca Spataro, 2013. "Pension funds and Market Efficiency: A review," Discussion Papers 2013/164, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    16. Steen Thomsen & Frederik Vinten, 2014. "Delistings and the costs of governance: a study of European stock exchanges 1996–2004," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(3), pages 793-833, August.
    17. Wong, Wei-Kang, 2008. "Comparing the fit of the gravity model for different cross-border flows," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 474-477, June.
    18. Wenming Xu & Guangdong Xu, 2016. "Truth and Robustness in Cross-country Law and Finance Regressions: A Bayesian analysis of the Empirical “Law Matters†Thesis," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 6(6), pages 1-6.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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