Managerial Earnings Trends in Deregulated Transport Industries
Deregulation that encouraged greater competition in several transport industries has facilitated the erosion of workers' earnings premiums in these industries. This study examines whether deregulation also influences the relative earnings of low- to mid-level managers in these industries. In contrast to transport workers, managers in airline, railroad, and trucking industries received significant pre-deregulation discounts. Such discounts support the hypothesis that regulators faced political pressure to constrain the compensation of transport managers. These discounts for airline and railroad managers do not change immediately following deregulation. Such findings are consistent with past findings on CEO compensation in these industries. Only the discounts of managers in trucking decline consistently over the post-deregulation period. The findings in this study indicate that transport managers are not guaranteed improved relative earnings in a more competitive business environment, even if regulators face an easing of political pressure to constrain managerial earnings. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003
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