Governance Mechanisms in Public Agencies: the Italian Practice in an International Perspective
New Public Management calls for a clear division between politics and the administration, where the former undertakes strategic planning and defines economic targets and the latter is responsible for public service management. In this context, the agency theory underlines a risk of incoherence between administrative action and political target achievement. This paper aims to analyse the governance mechanisms and the related accountability requirement in order to investigate if there is a conflict between the autonomy of public agencies and political target achievement. In particular, according to a multiple case study analysis, this paper considers three Italian public agencies: Revenue Agency, Social Security National Institute and National Procurement Agency (CONSIP). The research identifies the variables characterizing the relationship between politics and administration and shows the conditions that allow an autonomous public agency to move in a coherent manner along with political targets.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): ()
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