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Matching with floor constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Akin, Sumeyra

    (Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Akin, Sumeyra, 2021. "Matching with floor constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3785
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20210911/31449/902
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tsuyoshi Adachi & Yuki Ishibashi, 2022. "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with interval constraints," Working Papers 2124, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    2. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, "undated". "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/05, Department of Economics, University of York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; floor constraints; efficiency; stability; strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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