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Regulatory Intensification and Pension Fund Performance: Evidence from Pension Funds in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Elder Maciel de Aquino

    (Department of Accounting and Actuarial Science, School of Economics, Administration and Accounting, University of São Paulo)

  • Fernando Dal-Ri Murcia

    (Department of Accounting and Actuarial Science, School of Economics, Administration and Accounting, University of São Paulo)

  • Ferr Heury

    (Department of Accounting and Actuarial Science, School of Economics, Administration and Accounting, University of São Paulo)

Abstract

Purpose: This paper evaluates the causal impact of prudential regulatory intensification on Brazilian closed pension funds classified as systemically important (EFPC-ESI). The study aims to determine whether stricter governance, reporting, and compliance requirements, implemented as an asymmetric regulatory shock in 2019, produced structural improvements in these entities. Design/methodology/approach: The study employed an empirical strategy using annual panel time-series data from 2014–2023. It compares EFPC-ESI (treatment group) with comparable non-ESI funds (control group). The methodology combines structural break tests and interaction-based regressions to distinguish persistent regulatory effects from transitory dynamics within the same institutional environment. Findings: The results show that regulatory intensification generated statistically significant structural changes in capital-related indicators, particularly total assets and consolidated performance. However, effects on population and sustainability measures were found to be limited or non-persistent. The evidence suggests that heightened prudential supervision acts primarily as an amplifier of existing financial trajectories rather than producing broad structural shifts. Research limitations/implications: The findings raise relevant questions about regulatory inflation and the cost–benefit trade-offs in pension fund supervision. A potential limitation involves the specific focus on the Brazilian institutional environment, which may require further comparative studies in other emerging markets to generalize the impact of asymmetric regulatory shocks. Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature by providing a quasi-experimental analysis of regulatory shocks within the pension fund sector. It offers a unique perspective on how "systemically important" classifications affect institutional performance, shifting the debate from simple compliance to the actual structural efficacy of prudential supervision.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Elder Maciel de Aquino & Fernando Dal-Ri Murcia & Ferr Heury, 2025. "Regulatory Intensification and Pension Fund Performance: Evidence from Pension Funds in Brazil," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH), Kavala Campus, Greece, vol. 18(2), pages 1-8, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:tei:journl:v:18:y:2025:i:2:p:64-71
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. James M. Poterba & Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, 2008. "New Estimates of the Future Path of 401(k) Assets," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 22, pages 43-80, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. repec:idb:brikps:60278 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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